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A B S T R A C T
When explaining human actions, people usually focus on a small subset of potential causes. What leads us to prefer
certain explanations for valenced actions over others? The present studies indicate that our moral attitudes often
predict our explanatory preferences far better than our beliefs about how causally sensitive actions are to features of
the actor’s environment. Study 1 found that high-prejudice participants were much more likely to endorse non-
agential explanations of an erotic same-sex encounter, such as that one of the men endured a stressful event earlier
that day. Study 2 manipulated participants’ beliefs about how the agent’s behavior depended on features of his
environment, ﬁnding that such beliefs played no clear role in modeling participants’ explanatory preferences. This
result emerged both with low- and high-prejudice, US and Indian participants, suggesting that these ﬁndings
probably reﬂect a species-typical feature of human psychology. Study 3 found that moral attitudes also predicted
explanations for a woman’s decision to abort her pregnancy (3a) and a person’s decision to convert to Islam (3b).
Study 4 found that luck in an action’s etiology tends to undermine perceptions of blame more readily than per-
ceptions of praise. Finally, Study 5 found that when explaining support for a rival ideology, both Liberals and
Conservatives downplay agential causes while emphasizing environmental ones. Taken together, these studies in-
dicate that our explanatory preferences often reﬂect a powerful tendency to represent agents as possessing virtuous
true selves. Consequently, situation-focused explanations often appear salient because people resist attributing ne-
gatively valenced actions to the true self. There is a person/situation distinction, but it is normative.
The concept of the true self plays a central role in folk psychology
(Strohminger, Knobe, & Newman, 2017). Beliefs about the true self
predict people’s intuitions about personal identity (De Freitas,
Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2018; Prinz & Nichols, 2016, chap.
26; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014, 2015), what a person values
(Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2013), whether a person is happy
(Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2014; Phillips, Misenheimer, &
Knobe, 2011), weak-willed (Newman et al., 2014), morally re-
sponsible (Newman et al., 2014), and leading a meaningful life
(Schlegel, Hicks, Arndt, & King, 2009; Schlegel, Hicks, King, &
Arndt, 2011). Moreover, beliefs about the true self appear to mod-
erate intergroup bias (De Freitas & Cikara, 2018) and decision sa-
tisfaction (Kim, Christy, Hicks, & Schlegel, 2017). Collectively, these
studies reveal a powerful tendency for people to attribute char-
acteristics they perceive as virtuous to the true self; immoral char-
acteristics tend to be represented as more superﬁcial aspects of the
self (De Freitas, Cikara, Grossmann, & Schlegel, 2017; De Freitas,
Tobia, Newman, & Knobe, 2016). For example, when participants
consider an evangelical Christian man who believes homosexuality
to be immoral while also ﬁnding himself sexually attracted to men,
prejudiced participants are less likely to represent the agent’s sexual
orientation as part of his true self (Newman et al., 2013).
This paper explores the role that beliefs about the true self play in
what may seem an unrelated area of psychology—the study of the
cognitive processes that incline people to explain behavior in more or
less situational terms. The distinction is a familiar one. Both common-
sense and scientiﬁc psychology distinguish actions that arise from
within an agent from those that are attributable to the circumstances in
which the agent acts (e.g., Frankfurt, 1971; Heider, 1983/1958; Jones
& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973; Smith, 2005; Watson, 1996). To help make
the distinction more concrete, consider Darley and Batson’s classic
(1973) ﬁnding: seminary students could be made six times less likely to
help an apparently injured person simply by being placed in circum-
stances where they felt they had to hurry to give a sermon. When we
consider one of the hurried seminarians rushing oﬀ to give his sermon,
ignoring the injured man, we tend to see his callousness as caused by
his randomization into the Hurried experimental condition (Darley &
Batson, 1973). To borrow a common metaphor, the experimental ma-
nipulation may seem to ‘externally determine’ the hurried seminarians’
antisocial behavior (Batson, Darley, & Coke, 1978).
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Intuitions like this one appear to be widely shared (Kunda & Nisbett,
1986; Ross, 1977); however, the cognitive processes that underlie such
intuitions remain unclear (Sabini, Siepmann, & Stein, 2001). How do
people classify actions along the ‘person/situation’ dichotomy? A major
theoretical tradition in social psychology holds that people locate the
causes of actions and events in much the same ‘commonsense’ way that
scientists do—namely, by assessing whether they occur only in the
presence of an external pressure, or whether they also occur in the
absence of that pressure (Kelley, 1967, 1973). Applied to our previous
example, such accounts hold that we judge the seminarian’s callous
behavior to result from ‘the situation’ because we believe he would
have acted benevolently in suﬃciently many other suﬃciently similar
circumstances (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1987; for philosophical insights
see, e.g., Lewis, 1986; Woodward, 2006).
Theorists have developed this basic picture in many ways, but they
have tended to agree that laypeople, like scientists, aim to rely on
causal-statistical (‘covariation’) information when explaining morally
valenced human actions. However, recent research on the concept of
the true self suggests that people may rely on strikingly unscientiﬁc
considerations for this purpose. In particular, the degree to which an
action appears to arise from features of the agent’s circumstances may
depend on whether the action appears to express the agent’s true self. If
we represent agents as fundamentally virtuous, our explanatory pre-
ferences—i.e., whether we tend to emphasize more agent- or more si-
tuation-focused factors when explaining an action—may in turn depend
on our moral attitudes towards the action. That is, we may prefer si-
tuation-focused explanations to the extent that we perceive a mismatch
in the moral valences of the agent’s action and true self.
To illustrate this idea, consider again one of the hurried seminar-
ians. On the hypothesis to be explored here—the mismatch hypothe-
sis—people tend to explain his callousness in terms of the experimental
condition into which he was randomized, to the extent that they believe
(a) his action was immoral, and (b) his true self is virtuous. On this
view, our beliefs about how valenced actions covary with features of
the situation should have a small impact on our explanatory preferences
relative to the impact of our beliefs about whether actions are essence-
disclosing. (Psychologists often use ‘self-disclosing’ to refer to any be-
havior that expresses something about an agent. In philosophical action
theory, the term is used more narrowly to refer only to actions that
express something about an agent’s true self. To avoid confusion, this
paper uses the unfamiliar term ‘essence-disclosing’ in this narrower,
action-theoretic sense.)
While the mismatch hypothesis has not been explicitly discussed or
explored in previous research, several independent lines of evidence
suggest that it warrants investigation. Jones and Nisbett (1972) fa-
mously hypothesized that we prefer to explain our own actions in terms
of features of the situations in which we act, while we prefer to attribute
other agents’ actions to their ‘internal’ dispositions. The mismatch hy-
pothesis predicts this asymmetry in the case of immoral behaviors. For,
researchers have consistently found that we tend to regard ourselves as
morally better than average (Epley & Dunning, 2000; Klein & Epley,
2016), which suggests that the valence of any given immoral behavior is
somewhat more likely to conﬂict with our assessments of our own true
selves than with our assessments of other agents’ true selves. Thus, the
mismatch hypothesis predicts the traditional actor-observer asymmetry
when the target action is immoral. However, parallel reasoning sug-
gests that the mismatch hypothesis predicts the opposite asymmetry for
virtuous behavior—since good actions are less likely to conﬂict with our
assessments of our own true selves than with our assessments of other
actors’. Consistent with this prediction, an authoritative meta-analysis
found no evidence for a morally neutral actor-observer asymmetry
(Malle, 2006). Rather, the classic asymmetry appeared in studies where
participants explained negative events, but reversed in studies where
they explained positive events, as the mismatch hypothesis predicts.
The same reasoning appears to apply to intergroup explanatory
preferences. If in-group members tend to think of themselves as having
morally better true selves than out-group members, the mismatch hy-
pothesis predicts that they will be more likely, compared to base rates,
to produce agent-focused explanations for their own members’ praise-
worthy acts and situation-focused explanations for their blameworthy
acts. Members of the out-group will get the opposite treatment. Social
psychologists have coined the phrase ‘ultimate attribution error’ to
describe this very patterning (Pettigrew, 1979). Taylor and Jaggi
(1974) ﬁrst investigated intergroup attribution in southern India,
against the backdrop of Hindu-Muslim conﬂict. They asked Hindu
participants to imagine themselves in various situations with either a
Hindu or a Muslim interlocutor. In all scenarios, Hindus were more
likely to give agent-focused explanations for the virtuous behavior of
another Hindu agent. The study was replicated in Malaysia with Malay
and Chinese subjects (Hewstone & Ward, 1985). If the tendency of in-
group members to regard themselves as, on average, morally better
than out-group members (Ellemers, Pagliaro, Barreto, & Leach, 2008;
Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007; Levine & Campbell, 1972; although,
cf., De Freitas & Cikara, 2018) extends to assessments of their true
selves, the mismatch hypothesis appears to predict the patterning of
intergroup explanatory preferences. (Note that the model does not as-
sume all agents are represented as maximally or equally virtuous.)
The present studies
The patterning of laypeople’s explanatory preferences suggests that
the mismatch hypothesis is a promising initial account of the conditions
that incline people to emphasize more agent- or situation-focused ex-
planations. However, previous research has not investigated the inﬂu-
ence of people’s beliefs about the true self on their explanatory pre-
ferences. The present studies begin exploring this question.
Studies 1–3 found that participants’ moral attitudes towards an
action predict their explanatory preferences far better than their beliefs
about how causally sensitive the action is to features of the agent’s
circumstances. This is true both for Western (North American) and non-
Western (Indian) participants. Studies 4 and 5 supported the hypothesis
that these surprising patterns reﬂect a more general feature of folk
psychology identiﬁed in recent research, namely, a bias to represent
agents as possessing morally virtuous true selves. The results indicate
that people often prefer situation-focused explanations because they
resist attributing negatively valenced actions to the true self. Study 4
tested this hypothesis by examining the conditions under which moral
luck undermines the perception that an agent is fully responsible for his
actions. Study 5 tested the hypothesis in the context of partisans’ ex-
planations of in-group and out-group political identities.
1. Study 1: Explaining gay sex
Consider the following vignette, adapted from Newman et al.
(2013):
Mark was born into a Christian family that eventually deteriorated,
leading his parents to divorce. After being pushed out of home early,
Mark met a new group of friends, some of whom were in same-sex
relationships. Mark believed that homosexuality is morally wrong,
and he encouraged his new friends to resist their attractions to
people of the same sex. However, Mark himself was attracted to
other men. He openly acknowledged this to his friends and discussed
it as part of his own personal struggle. Mark believed that it was his
duty to resist his feelings for other men, and he vowed to live a
morally decent life the only way he could—by remaining celibate.
But Mark sometimes failed to live up to his values. For example, one
day, after a bad ﬁght with his father, Mark went to see his friend
Bill. They shared a bottle of wine and talked for hours.
That night, Mark hit on Bill and they ended up having sex.
Many explanations for the agent’s action are possible. On the one
hand, his encounter with Bill plausibly depended to some degree on
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features of his situation: for example, the inﬂuence of his new friends
and the ﬁght he had with his father. On the other hand, facts about the
agent himself and his sexual dispositions also seem important. What
inclines people to prefer more agent- or situation-focusedexplanations?
Using a similar vignette, Newman et al. (2013) found that both
Liberals and Conservatives represent the agent’s true self as virtuous.
Thus, given the strong association of attitudes to homosexuality and
political identiﬁcation (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro,
Knobe, & Bloom, 2009), the mismatch hypothesis predicts that parti-
cipants with relatively positive attitudes towards homosexuality should
be more inclined to endorse agent-focused explanations and less in-
clined to endorse situation-focused explanations. Study 1 tested these
predictions.
1.1. Methods
1.1.1. Participants
Participants were 403 adults ranging in age from 19 to 75 years
(M=36, 55% female). In all studies, participants were recruited using
mTurk, provided informed consent, and were paid $0.20–$0.30.
1.1.2. Procedure
Participants read a vignette like the one described above. (All
vignettes are reproduced in Appendix A.) The vignette made available
various explanations for the agent’s action, which participants rated
(counterbalanced for order) on scales ranging from 1 (‘completely
disagree’) to 9 (‘completely agree’). Four explanations cited more agent-
focused factors—e.g., the agent had sex with another man because he is
gay—and four cited more situation-focused factors—e.g., the agent had
sex with another man because of the inﬂuence of his new friends
(Table 1). To report the degree to which his action seemed essence-
disclosing—i.e., expressive of his true self—participants rated the
statement “By having sex with Bill, Mark showed who he most truly is,
deep down” on a scale from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 9 (‘completely
agree’).
The short form of Herek’s (1998) Attitudes to Gay Men (ATLG) scale
served as a measure of the degree to which participants perceived the
agent’s action as immoral. Participants rated the following statements
(counterbalanced for order) on scales ranging from 1 (‘completely
disagree’) to 5 (‘completely agree’): *I think male homosexuals are
disgusting; *Male homosexuality is a perversion; Male homosexuality is
a natural expression of sexuality in men; *Sex between two men is just
plain wrong; Male homosexuality is merely a diﬀerent kind of lifestyle
that should not be condemned (*reverse-coded). As an attention check,
one item instructed participants to “select ‘agree’ for this question.”
Participants responded to two questions intended to test their
comprehension of the vignette: “How will Mark feel the next day when
he reﬂects on his action?” (proud/ashamed), and “What does Mark
believe?” (that homosexuality is moral/that homosexuality is immoral).
On the ﬁnal page of the survey, participants rated themselves on a scale
from 1 (‘extremely conservative’) to 7 (‘extremely liberal’) and in-
dicated their age and sex.
1.2. Results
Three hundred and sixty-four participants correctly responded to
the comprehension checks. Responses from participants who failed a
check were excluded, but this had no meaningful eﬀect.
1.2.1. Factor analysis
Tests of factorability indicated that participants’ ratings of the eight
explanations were suitable for factor analysis. For every item, there was
at least one other with which it was correlated at r⩾ .5. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .78, above the re-
commended threshold, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signiﬁcant,
χ2(28)= 1190, p < .001. Principal component analysis with varimax
rotation was therefore used to extract factor scores. Two components
with eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged that together explain 65% of
the variance in participants’ ratings of the eight explanations (Table 1).
The four intuitively situation-focused explanations loaded strongly onto
the ﬁrst component, which modeled 42% of the variance in responses,
and the four intuitively agent-focused explanations loaded strongly
onto the second component, which modeled the remaining 23%, in-
dicating that the explanations were appropriately grouped into di-
chotomous categories.
1.2.2. Attribution and moral attitudes
The attitudes to homosexuality scale was highly reliable
(Cronbach’s =α .94). Correlation coeﬃcients were therefore calcu-
lated for ATLG scores and the disaggregated person and situation com-
ponents extracted via factor analysis. ATLG scores predicted participants’
preferences for both agent-focused explanations, r(362)= .32, 95% CI:
[.23, .42], p < .001, and situation-focused explanations,
r(362)=−.45, 95% CI: [−.54,−.36], p < .001, indicating that pre-
judice may lead people to emphasize situation-focused rather than
agent-focused explanations for homosexual behavior.
Bootstrap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was used to test the
hypothesis that beliefs about whether the agent’s action expresses his
true self (‘essence-disclosure’) mediate the eﬀect of attitudes to homo-
sexuality on explanatory preferences. ATLG scores were set as the in-
dependent variable with essence-disclosure ratings as mediator and
person scores as DV (Fig. 1). Consistent with the mediation hypothesis,
the analysis revealed a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect: ab= .10, 95% CI
(bootstrapped): [.05, .17]. (All bias-corrected bootstrap conﬁdence in-
tervals were calculated using 5000 bootstrap samples.)
1.3. Discussion
This study found that participants’ moral attitudes towards homo-
sexuality powerfully predicted the degree to which they favored more
agent-focused or situation-focused explanations for an erotic encounter
between two men. Moreover, the results were consistent with a model
according to which the eﬀect of people’s moral attitudes on their ex-
planatory preferences is partially mediated by their beliefs about
Table 1
Factor loadings from exploratory principal component analysis on ratings of the
eight action-explanations (Study 1). Items are Likert-ratings of potential ex-
planations of the agent’s homosexual encounter.
Factor loadings with values> .5 are bolded.
Fig. 1. Mediation (Study 1). ∗p < .001.
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whether the encounter expressed the agent’s true self. Since people tend
to believe that the agent’s true self is virtuous regardless of their atti-
tudes towards homosexuality (Newman et al., 2013), these results ap-
pear to support the mismatch hypothesis. Participants who perceived a
mismatch in the valences of the agent’s action and true self rated the
situation attributions more highly and saw the action as less expressive
of the agent’s true self than did those who perceived no such mismatch.
The agent-focused explanations followed the reverse pattern.
The associations between participants’ ratings of the eight ex-
planations are also noteworthy. The fact that two-thirds of the variance
in participants’ explanatory preferences can be modeled by two or-
thogonal factors suggests that participants were responding to an un-
derlying dichotomy when they assessed the explanations for the agent’s
action. The fact that the explanations intuitively classiﬁed as agent-
focused and those intuitively classiﬁed as situation-focused neatly
sorted onto these two factors (Table 1) suggests that the relevant di-
chotomy is the intuitive person/situation distinction. This result helps
to allay concerns about whether the dichotomy reﬂects an important
feature of how human beings actually explain intentional behavior
(e.g., Malle, 2011; Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, & Nelson, 2000).
2. Study 2: The role of causal information
It might be objected that whereas participants with negative atti-
tudes towards homosexuality may be more inclined to think that the
agent’s sexual orientation is fundamentally something he has chosen,
participants with more positive attitudes may think that he was born
gay and there’s not much use in ﬁghting it (Haider-Markel & Joslyn,
2008; Jayaratne et al., 2006; Lewis, 2009; Suhay & Jayaratne, 2012).
Thus, because people tend to believe that actions arising from innate
traits are more stable across time and less sensitive to environmental
variation than those acquired as result of choice (Gelman, 2003;
Gelman, Heyman, & Legare, 2007; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004),
the results of Study 1 might be explained on the hypothesis that our
attitudes to homosexuality inﬂuence the degree to which we perceive
same-sex attraction as causally sensitive to variations in the agent’s
situation. In particular, high-prejudice participants may be more likely
than low-prejudice participants to represent the agent’s action as cau-
sally sensitive to speciﬁc features of his situation. This diﬀerence may
explain why high levels of anti-gay prejudice predict a strong pre-
ference for situation-focused explanations of the agent’s erotic same-sex
encounter. Study 2 tested this rival explanation against the mismatch
hypothesis by directly manipulating the degree to which participants
viewed the agent’s action as causally sensitive to his circumstances.
North American mTurkers tend to have highly positive attitudes
towards homosexuality—the median ATLG score among North American
participants is 21 out of 25 (Fig. 3). Study 2 also sought to replicate the
basic valence-explanation asymmetry with participants who hold more
negative attitudes towards homosexuality. Indian populations tend to
have more negative attitudes towards sexuality and sexual orientation
than North American populations (Asthana & Oostvogels, 2001; Patel,
Mayer, & Makadon, 2012; Tahmindjis, 2014). Moreover, researchers
have found evidence for belief in the virtuous true self when studying
participants in the United States, Russia, Singapore, and Colombia (De
Freitas et al., 2018), suggesting that this belief reﬂects a species-typical
feature of human psychology. Thus, relative to North Americans, we
should expect Indian participants to be signiﬁcantly:
1. more inclined towards situation-focused explanations,
2. less inclined towards agent-focused explanations, and
3. less inclined to view the action as essence-disclosing.
Study 2 tested these predictions with a sample of English-speaking
Indian participants recruited via mTurk.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
A new group of 238 North American participants ranging in age
from 18 to 74 years (M=35.8, 48% female) were recruited using
mTurk. Additionally, 252 Indian participants ranging in age from 21 to
68 years (M=32.6, 22% female) were recruited using mTurk.
TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017) was used to verify
that these participants were located in India.
2.1.2. Procedure
Participants were randomized into one of three conditions. The
vignette for the Baseline condition was drawn from Study 1 without
modiﬁcation. The two other conditions were formed by appending one
or the other of the following texts to the end of the original vignette:
Person condition: Most people don’t ﬁnd Bill attractive, but Mark
has often been sexually attracted to Bill. In fact, Mark often ex-
periences attraction to other men, too.
Situation condition: Most people don’t ﬁnd Bill attractive, and in the
past Mark himself has rarely felt sexually attracted to Bill. In fact,
Mark rarely experiences attraction to other men, either.
Participants who read that Mark rarely ﬁnds Bill or other men at-
tractive should come to represent Mark’s behavior as highly causally
sensitive to his situation (i.e., it exhibited low “consistency” and high
“distinctiveness”). For, if the traits which led to his encounter with Bill
were causally insensitive to relevant changes in his circumstances, the
agent would commonly experience same-sex attraction. Thus, because
participants in the Situation condition read that he is not commonly
attracted to other men, they should be more likely than participants in
the Person condition to judge that his actions were highly causally
sensitive to the details of the situation.
To test this hypothesis, participants rated the following (counter-
balanced) statements:
Weak robustness: If he were in the very same circumstances in the
future, how probable do you think it is that Mark would have sex
with Bill again? (1: Not at all probable – 7: Extremely probable.)
Strong robustness: Imagine that a week goes by until Mark next sees
Bill. Now Mark is feeling much better about the ﬁght with his father
and is generally back to his usual self. How probable do you think it
is that Mark will have sex with Bill on this occasion? (1: Not at all
probable – 7: Extremely probable.)
All other methods were drawn directly from Study 1.
2.2. Results (North American participants)
Two hundred and six participants passed the comprehension checks.
Responses from participants who failed at least one check were ex-
cluded, but this did not meaningfully aﬀect the pattern of results.
2.2.1. Manipulation checks
To test whether the experimental manipulation aﬀected partici-
pants’ beliefs about how causally sensitive the agent’s action is to fea-
tures of the situation, two-way ANOVA tests were conducted using ex-
perimental condition as the independent variable and weak or strong
robustness as the dependent variable. The experimental manipulation
had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on participants’ ratings of both weak robustness,
F(2,203)= 9.2, p < .001, and strong robustness, F(2,203)= 7.3,
p= .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that participants in the Situation
condition, who read that the agent has rarely experienced same-sex
attraction, gave signiﬁcantly lower ratings of weak robustness,
d=−0.63, 95% CI: [−0.92,−0.33], and strong robustness,
d=−0.56, 95% CI: [−0.85,−0.27], than did participants in the
Person and Baseline conditions. However, the Person and Baseline
conditions did not diﬀer meaningfully on either measure (ps > .5).
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These results indicate that the experimental manipulation succeeded in
making the agent’s behavior seem more causally sensitive to environ-
mental factors in the Situation condition. Notably, in this condition,
participants were signiﬁcantly less likely to predict that the agent
would repeat his actions in similar circumstances in the future.
2.2.2. Factor analysis
Participants’ ratings of the eight explanations were suitable for
principal component analysis (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin= .74; Bartlett’s test
of sphericity: χ2(28)= 616, p < .001). Replicating Study 1, the four
intuitively situation-focused explanations loaded strongly onto a single
component, which explained 40% of the variance, and the four in-
tuitively agent-focused items loaded strongly onto a second component,
which explained the remaining 22%.
2.2.3. Attribution and moral attitudes
Herek’s attitudes to homosexuality scale was again highly reliable
(α= .95). ATLG scores and dummy variables representing the experi-
mental conditions were regressed against situation scores, person
scores, and essence-disclosure ratings. ATLG scores signiﬁcantly pre-
dicted all three dependent variables (Table 2). Additionally, the ex-
perimental manipulation had a small, borderline-signiﬁcant eﬀect on
participants’ ratings of the agent-focused explanations but did not
predict any of the other measures. Repeating the analysis using ratings
of the individual explanations as DVs revealed that the Situation con-
dition diﬀered signiﬁcantly only on two of the eight explanations:
compared to the Person and Baseline conditions, participants in the
Situation condition gave lower ratings to the statements “Mark had sex
with Bill because he is gay,” t(204)= 2.4, p= .017, d=0.35, 95% CI:
[0.06, 0.64], and “Mark had sex with Bill because he is attracted to
men,” t(204)= 3.5, p < .001, d=0.51, 95% CI: [0.22, 0.84].
These data raise the possibility that the experimental manipulation
did not aﬀect participants’ preferences for the agent-focused explana-
tions directly; rather, learning that Mark reliably ﬁnds neither Bill nor
other men attractive may cause participants to represent his encounter
with Bill as less revealing of his true self, which may in turn make the
agent-focused explanations seem less appropriate. To test this hypoth-
esis, a bootstrap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was conducted using
an independent variable that was coded ‘1’ if a participant was ran-
domized into the Situation condition and ‘0’ otherwise, essence-dis-
closure ratings as the mediator, and participants’ mean ratings of the
agent-focused explanations as the dependent variable (Fig. 2). The
analysis indicated that the degree to which the agent’s action appears to
reﬂect his true self signiﬁcantly mediated the eﬀect of the Situation
condition on participants’ ratings of the agent-focused explanations:
ab=−.20, 95% CI: [−.41,−.04].
2.3. Replication with Indian participants
Two hundred and two Indian participants correctly responded to the
attention and comprehension checks. Data from other Indian partici-
pants were excluded. The sample skewed strongly male, however, no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerged between male (N=159) and female
(N=43) participants on any measure (ps > .5).
While the results found with North Americans replicated with
Indian participants (Table 3), there were large diﬀerences between how
the two groups explained the agent’s action (Fig. 3). Compared to North
Americans, Indian participants were signiﬁcantly:
1. more inclined to favor situation explanations, t(406) = 11.0,
p< .001, d = 1.1, 95% CI: [0.88, 1.30],
2. less inclined to favor person explanations, t(406) =−7.1, p< .001,
d = −0.70, 95% CI: [−0.90, −0.50], and
3. less inclined to view the action as essence-disclosing, t(406) = 2.4,
p = .016, d = 0.24, 95% CI: [0.04, 0.43].
To test whether moral attitudes towards homosexuality have a similar
inﬂuence on Indian and North American participants’ explanatory pre-
ferences, ATLG scores and dummy variables representing nationality and
experimental condition were regressed against agent scores, situation
scores, and essence-disclosure ratings in fully crossed models. Indian na-
tionality did not have any eﬀect (ps > .5). Similarly, there were no sig-
niﬁcant interactions between IVs (ps > .5). However, moral attitudes to
homosexuality (as measured by ATLG scores) continued to predict partici-
pants’ ratings of the agent-focused explanations, β=.32, 95% CI:
[.23, .41], p < .001, the situation-focused explanations, β=−.37, 95%
CI: [−.46,−.28], p < .001, and the essence-disclosure measure, β=.27,
95% CI: [.17, .36], p < .001, conﬁrming all predictions derived from the
mismatch hypothesis. This is noteworthy as Indian participants held
strikingly more negative attitudes towards homosexuality than did North
Americans, d=−0.90, 95% CI: [−1.10,−0.69], p < .001.
2.4. Discussion
This study found that both North American and Indian participants’
moral attitudes towards homosexuality are highly predictive of their
preferences for agent-focused vs. situation-focused explanations of an
erotic encounter between two men. By contrast, beliefs about how the
action covaried with changes in the actor’s circumstances did not re-
liably predict explanatory preferences.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, people are less inclined to explain same-sex
attraction in terms of the agent’s sexual orientation when they are told
that he does not reliably ﬁnd other men attractive. However, it is sur-
prising that this eﬀect is so much smaller than the eﬀect of people’s
moral attitudes towards homosexuality. For predicting how someone will
explain a same-sex encounter, it is far more useful to know about their
prejudices than it is to know the degree to which they represent the agent’s
erotic feelings as causally covarying with his situation.Moreover, data from
Indian participants indicates that this ﬁnding is unlikely to reﬂect a
uniquely WEIRD concept of human agency (Henrich, Heine, &
Norenzayan, 2010). Instead, consistent with previous research (De
Freitas et al., 2018), belief in the virtuous true self appears to reﬂect a
species-typical feature of human psychology.
Table 2
Summary of regression models from Study 2 (North American sample). Notes:
baseline condition omitted; to compare the eﬀect sizes of categorical and
continuous predictors, this table provides ηp
2 values.
aR2= .20, F(202,3)= 16.8, p < .001. bR2 = .15, F(202,3)= 12.2. p < .001.
cR2= .13, F(202,3)= 9.7, p < .001.
Fig. 2. Mediation (Study 2). ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .001.
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3. Study 3: Generalizing
The case for the mismatch hypothesis would be considerably
strengthened if the eﬀect of moral attitudes on our explanatory pre-
ferences could be measured using a variety of target actions that, unlike
sex between two men, do not reﬂect dispositions that we believe to be
innate or chosen depending on our moral attitudes towards the actions
(Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008). Studies 3a and 3b therefore attempted
to replicate the basic mismatch eﬀect using varied stimuli unrelated to
sexual orientation.
3.1. Study 3a: Abortion
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were 204 North Americans ranging in age from 18 to
69 years (M=33, 49% female).
3.1.2. Procedure
All participants read a vignette about a college senior, Kate, who
discovers she is pregnant and later decides to have an abortion (see
Appendix A for the complete vignette). The vignette made available
various explanations for her decision (Table 4). Next, participants read
that “Some of our actions reﬂect who we are deep down; they reveal
our true selves,” and rated the statement “Kate’s decision to have an
abortion reﬂects what she wants deep down.” Participants then re-
sponded to two items aimed at measuring their beliefs about the causal
sensitivity of Kate’s decision to her circumstances:
Weak robustness: If she were in the very same circumstances again,
how probable is it that Kate would have another abortion?
Strong robustness: Imagine that two years later Kate has another
unwanted pregnancy. Now she lives in a diﬀerent part of the country
and is working as an intern at a hospital. How probable is it that she
will also abort this second pregnancy?
Finally, participants completed a novel Moral Attitudes to Abortion
(MATA) scale consisting of the following items (counterbalanced for
order): Having an abortion is a disgusting thing to do; Abortion is just
plain wrong; *Access to abortions should be free and easy; Abortion is
only ever justiﬁed when a pregnancy seriously threatens the mother’s
life; Doctors who perform abortions are evil. All other materials were
drawn without modiﬁcation from previous experiments.
3.1.3. Results
One hundred and eighty-seven participants correctly responded to
the comprehension checks. Responses from participants who failed
more than one check were excluded, but this had no meaningful eﬀect.
Factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was .50, slightly below the recommended threshold.
However, the mean inter-item correlation was high, r(185)= .77, and
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was signiﬁcant, χ2(6)= 129, p < .001. PCA
with varimax rotation was therefore used to extract factor scores. Two
components emerged that together explained 76% of the variance in
participants’ ratings of the four explanations (Table 4). Consistent with
Studies 1 and 2, the two intuitively agent-focused explanations loaded
strongly onto the ﬁrst component which modeled 41% of the variance,
and the two intuitively situation-focused items loaded strongly onto the
second component which modeled the remaining 35%, indicating that
participants drew the intuitive distinction, as intended.
Attribution and moral attitudes. The Moral Attitudes to Abortion
(MATA) scale was highly reliable (α= .94), so the items were summed to
create an overall MATA score. MATA scores and robustness ratings were
regressed against three dependent variables: situation scores, person
scores, and essence-disclosure ratings (Table 5). In each model, moral
attitudes signiﬁcantly predicted the dependent variable. Weak
Table 3
Linear models from Indian sample (Study 2). Baseline omitted.
aR2= .09, F(198,3)= 6.5, p < .001. bR2 = .11, F(198,3)= 8.0, p < .001.
cR2= .05, F(198,3)= 3.4, p= .02.
Fig. 3. North American and Indian participants (Study 2). Note: box plot boundaries are Q1, Q2, Q3, Q3+1.5 · IQR (Tukey-style).
Table 4
Factor loadings from exploratory principal component analysis (Study 3a).
Items are Likert-ratings of potential explanations for the agent’s decision to
abort her pregnancy.
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robustness signiﬁcantly predicted essence-disclosure ratings; however,
strong robustness was not a signiﬁcant predictor in any model.
3.2. Study 3b: Islamic conversion
3.2.1. Participants
Participants were 201 North Americans ranging in age from 18 to
55 years (M=36, 45% female).
3.2.2. Procedure
Participants read a vignette about Jane, a girl born into a Christian
family that eventually deteriorates, leading her parents to divorce.
Jane’s mother pushes her out of home, leading her to meet new friends
at the local mosque: “Jane valued what she saw as their moral up-
rightness, and she perceived a kind of moral clarity in Islamic texts
which she found reassuring. She came to believe that Islam is the one
true path to God. Eventually, Jane decided she would convert to Islam.”
(See Appendix A for the complete vignette.) Participants then rated
potential explanations for the agent’s decision (Table 6). Next, partici-
pants rated the statement “Jane’s decision to convert to Islam reﬂects
her true self—who she is at the deepest level.” Because religious con-
version is an event that is unlikely to reoccur within a single person’s
life (Smith & Cooperman, 2015), Study 3b did not attempt to measure
participants’ beliefs about how the agent’s decision would covary with
features of her situation.
Participants then completed a novel Moral Attitudes to Muslims
(MATM) scale consisting of the following items (counterbalanced for
order): *Muslims are less intelligent; *Muslims are dirty; *Muslims are
more likely to commit crimes; Most Muslims do NOT support violence
against innocent people; I would feel comfortable being in close per-
sonal contact with a Muslim; Muslims are peaceful people.
All other methods were equivalent to Study 1.
3.2.3. Results
One hundred and eighty-three participants passed the comprehen-
sion checks. Responses from participants who failed at least one check
were excluded, but this had no meaningful eﬀect.
Factor analysis. Participants’ ratings of the eight explanations were
again suitable for PCA (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .69; Bartlett’s test
of sphericity: χ2(15)= 396, p < .001). Consistent with previous ex-
periments, factor loadings expressed the intuitive person/situation di-
chotomy (Table 6). The three intuitively situation-focused explanations
loaded strongly onto the ﬁrst component which modeled 46% of the
variance, and the three intuitively agent-focused items loaded strongly
onto the second component which modeled 24% of the variance, in-
dicating that participants distinguished between the explanations in the
expected way.
Attribution and moral attitudes. The Moral Attitudes to Muslims
(MATM) scale proved highly reliable (α= .93), so responses to the in-
dividual items were summed to form overall MATM scores. Pearson
correlations were calculated for MATM scores and explanatory pre-
ferences. Participants’ MATM scores predicted both person ratings,
r= .33, 95% CI: [.19, .47], t(181)= 4.6, p < .001, and situation rat-
ings, r=−.48, 95% CI: [−.60, .−35], t(181)=−7.6, p < .001.
Replicating previous results, MATM scores strongly predicted the
degree to which participants viewed the agent’s decision as expressing
her true self, r= .40, 95% CI: [.27, .54], t(181)= 5.8, p < .001, sug-
gesting that beliefs about the true self may mediate the eﬀect of moral
attitudes on explanatory preferences. To test this hypothesis, a boot-
strap mediation analysis (Hayes, 2013) was performed using MATM
scores as the independent variable, essence-disclosure ratings as the
mediator, and person scores as the dependent variable (Fig. 4). Con-
sistent with the mediation hypothesis, the analysis revealed a sig-
niﬁcant indirect eﬀect: ab= .21, 95% CI: [.12, .33]. Notably, the direct
eﬀect of moral attitudes on person attribution was relatively small
when true-self ratings were included in the regression model, β= .12,
95% CI: [−.01, .25], t(181)= 1.8, p= .081.
3.2.4. Discussion
Consistent with the mismatch hypothesis, Studies 3a and 3b re-
vealed powerful associations between participants’ moral attitudes and
their explanatory preferences. Thus, because these studies employed
stimuli unrelated to sexual orientation, the results of Studies 1 and 2 are
unlikely to reﬂect a distinctive bias associated with anti-gay prejudice.
In particular, they are unlikely to reﬂect any systematic relationship
between moral attitudes towards homosexuality and beliefs about
whether same-sex attraction arises from choice or innate disposition.
Rather, the association of moral attitudes both with explanatory style
and with the degree to which actions appear expressive of actors’ true
selves appears to be surprisingly general.
4. Study 4: Good deeds of passion
Studies 1–3 indicate that people’s explanatory preferences and be-
liefs about essence-disclosure are related. One hypothesis consistent
with these results is that beliefs about whether an action expresses the
agent’s true self mediate the eﬀect of participants’ moral attitudes on
their explanatory preferences. That is, people may treat a perceived
mismatch in the moral valences of the action and the agent’s true self as
evidence that the action did not express the true self, and this may in
turn incline them towards explanations of the action which do not
implicate the true self. Such explanations tend to highlight features of
the agent’s environment or upbringing.
Because people tend to represent the true self as virtuous (Newman
et al., 2013), this hypothesis predicts that people may favor a situation-
focused explanation when explaining a bad deed but ignore that same
explanation when explaining a virtuous one (cf., Newman et al., 2014;
Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). We can return to Darley and
Table 5
Summary of regression models (Study 3a).
aR2= .09, F(198,3)= 6.5, p < .001. bR2 = .11, F(198,3)= 8.0, p < .001.
cR2= .05, F(198,3)= 3.4, p= .026.
Table 6
Factor loadings from exploratory principal component analysis (Study 3b).
Items are Likert-ratings of potential explanations for an agent’s decision to
convert to Islam.
Factor loadings with values> .5 are bolded.
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Batson’s (1973) study to illustrate the asymmetry. Recall that Darley
and Batson found that unhurried seminarians were six times more likely
than hurried seminarians to help a stranger slumped in a doorway. As
noted, when people focus on hurried seminarians who ignore the
victim, they judge that the callous behavior is explained by the ex-
perimental manipulation. However, this situation-focused explanation
can seem much less attractive when we consider the helpful partici-
pants in the Relaxed condition; it may seem that whereas the Hurried
condition masked participants’ true selves, the Relaxed condition al-
lowed them to shine through.
So here we seem to have two agents that are causally sensitive to
the environment in precisely the same way, yet a situation-focused
explanation (“he acted because of the experimental condition into
which he was randomized”) does not seem appropriate for the un-
hurried seminarian who helped the victim. If our beliefs about
whether actions are essence-disclosing mediate the eﬀect of moral
valence on our preferences for agent- or situation-focused explana-
tions, this pattern is exactly what we should expect to ﬁnd. Because
we tend to represent agents as ‘deep down’ normatively aligned with
ourselves, when the hurried seminarians ignore the victim, their
actions seem less essence-disclosing than when the relaxed semi-
narians help the victim. This may be what leads us to favor situation-
focused explanations in one case but not the other. Study 4 explored
this hypothesis by investigating the conditions that incline people to
attribute an action to luck.
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Participants were 502 North Americans ranging in age from 18 to
70 years (M=32, 44% female).
4.1.2. Procedure
The experiment employed a 2 (valence: good vs. bad)× 2 (moral
luck: emphasized vs. not emphasized) × 2 (DV: responsibility vs. es-
sence-disclosure) between-subjects design. Participants read one of four
vignettes about a person born in the United States in the early 1800s
who does something immoral (owns and mistreats slaves) or virtuous
(helps slaves escape). In two conditions, the vignettes emphasized the
role of chance in the agent’s life:
Chance played a big role in Tom’s life. He was born in the Northern
[Southern] United States in the early 1800s, but as a baby he was
adopted by Southern plantation owners [Northern abolitionists]
who raised him in the South [North]. If he had been raised by his
biological parents, he would have grown up in the North [South],
and he would have led a morally better [worse] life. But as a matter
of fact, Tom himself went on to own slaves [work on the
Underground Railroad to help people escape from slavery], and in
this way he hurt [helped] many people over the course of his life.
The control conditions simply omitted the features expected to focus
participants on the role of luck in the agents’ lives:
Tom was born in the Southern [Northern] United States in the early
1800s. Tom owned many slaves [worked on the Underground
Railroad to help people escape from slavery] and in this way he hurt
[helped] many people over the course of his life.
To ensure that any similarities in participants’ responsibility and
essence-disclosure ratings would not be an artifact of the survey design,
participants were randomly assigned to rate either the agent’s degree of
responsibility or the degree to which his action was essence-disclosing:
Responsibility: “How negatively [positively] does Tom deserve to be
judged?” (1=Not at all negatively [positively], 7=Extremely ne-
gatively [positively].) “How much blame [praise] does Tom de-
serve?” (1=No blame [praise] at all, 7= Extreme blame [praise]).
Essence-disclosure: “Helping [harming] people did not reﬂect Tom’s
true self—the person he really is deep down” (1= strongly disagree,
9= strongly agree).
The two responsibility measures were counterbalanced for order
and the essence-disclosure measure was reverse-coded. All other
methods were consistent with previous experiments.
This experiment required a measure of the degree to which parti-
cipants attribute an agent’s actions to luck that did not itself make the
role luck plays in all people’s lives salient. For example, from one’s own
perspective, the place of one’s birth is entirely a matter of luck. Thus, if
participants had been asked “Did the agent own and mistreat slaves
[work on the Underground Railroad] because he was raised in the South
[North]?” this would eﬀectively have made the situation-focused ex-
planation salient in both the Luck and Control conditions. The con-
nection between luck and moral responsibility suggests that we can use
participants’ responsibility attributions to gauge the degree to which
they explain an action in terms of situational luck (Levy, 2011; Nagel,
1979; Williams, 1981). This approach seems unlikely to make luck-
based explanations salient to participants in the Control conditions.
4.2. Results
Four hundred and seventy-six participants correctly responded to
the attention check; participants who failed were excluded.
4.2.1. Essence-disclosure
Essence-disclosure ratings were regressed against luck and valence
in a fully crossed design. The resulting model, presented in Table 7a,
was signiﬁcant, R2= .20, F(3,230)= 20, p < .001. Main eﬀects
emerged for both luck and valence (Fig. 5) such that participants rated
working on the Underground Railroad as much more essence-disclosing
than owning and mistreating slaves, d=0.85, 95% CI: [0.58, 1.11].
Critically, a signiﬁcant luck × valence interaction emerged. When the
agent was described as owning and mistreating slaves, participants who
read that he had been adopted by Southerners gave signiﬁcantly lower
essence-disclosure ratings than participants who did not read this in-
formation. Thus, emphasizing the role of luck in the agent’s life reduced
the degree to which participants rated his highly immoral behavior as
expressive of his true self, d=−0.73, 95% CI: [−1.11,−0.34].
However, when the agent was described as helping people to escape
from slavery, emphasizing the role that luck played in his life did not
lead participants to rate his action as less essence-disclosing, d=0.08.
4.2.2. Responsibility
Responses to the two responsibility items were highly consistent
( =α .91), so they were averaged to create a composite responsibility
score. The analysis was repeated with responsibility scores as the de-
pendent variable. The resulting model (Table 7b) was signiﬁcant,
R2= .28, F(3,238)= 31, p < .001. Main eﬀects again emerged for
both luck and valence such that participants more strongly praised the
Underground Railroad worker than they blamed the slave owner,
d=1.1, 95% CI: [0.79, 1.33]. Mirroring the patterning of essence-
Fig. 4. Mediation (Study 3b). Note: only the indirect eﬀect was signiﬁcant.
∗∗∗p < .001.
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disclosure ratings, the eﬀect of luck × valence was also signiﬁcant.
When the agent was described as owning and mistreating slaves, par-
ticipants who read that he had been adopted by Southerners gave sig-
niﬁcantly lower responsibility ratings than participants who were not
provided with information about luck. Thus, emphasizing the role of
luck in the agent’s life also reduced the degree to which participants
rated him as responsible for immoral deeds, d=−0.61, 95% CI:
[−0.97,−0.25], but had no meaningful eﬀect on how praiseworthy he
appeared for virtuous deeds.
4.3. Discussion
The substantial reduction in blame ratings in the Bad Luck condition
indicates that participants in that condition were more likely to explain
the Northern-born agent’s immoral deeds in terms of his unlucky
adoption by Southern plantation owners. However, because we see no
reduction in praise ratings in the Good Luck condition, it seems parti-
cipants did not similarly explain the Southern-born agent’s virtuous
deeds in terms of his fortunate adoption by Northern abolitionists.
Thus, participants were more inclined towards a situation-focused ex-
planation for an immoral action than for a virtuous action, even when
the same explanation was made salient in the very same way.
The close symmetry of responses to the essence-disclosure and re-
sponsibility items is especially noteworthy as diﬀerent participants re-
sponded to each measure. The hypothesis that beliefs about essence-
disclosure mediate the eﬀect of moral attitudes on explanatory pre-
ferences provides a natural explanation for this association: because we
implicitly assume that the true self is good, immoral deeds appear less
essence-disclosing than virtuous deeds. This suggests that the asym-
metry in whether we perceive an agent’s actions as essence-disclosing
leads to an asymmetry in how we explain the agent’s action: situation-
focused explanations appear more appropriate when we explain why a
person owned and mistreated slaves than they do when we explain why
a person helped slaves escape. In turn, this explanatory asymmetry
leads us to less strongly blame the slave-owning agent, but does not
lead us to view the slave-helping agent as less praiseworthy because his
actions do not challenge the presumption that his virtuous deeds ex-
pressed his true self.
This account is consistent with the mediation results from
Studies 1–3 and provides further independent support for the hy-
pothesis that beliefs about essence-disclosure mediate the eﬀect of
mismatching valences on explanatory preferences. However, while
it seems very likely that working on the Underground Railroad is
widely represented as morally better than owning human beings, it
is plausible that it is also represented as having been rarer. Thus,
participants are likely to know that in the antebellum South, for the
purpose of categorization, owning slaves was less informative than
working on the Underground Railroad. It is possible that this dif-
ference in the diagnostic value of the actions might interact with the
presence or absence of luck. An ideal concluding study, therefore,
would show that beliefs about essence-disclosure mediate the eﬀect
of moral attitudes on explanatory preferences in a context where the
target actions are widely known to be equally diagnostic. Few ac-
tions split participants into two large and easily identiﬁable groups
who attach equal-and-opposite moral valences to actions known to
be equally common; however, recent research indicates that there
are at least two: voting Democratic and voting Republican. Thus,
Table 7
Linear models predicting essence-disclosure and responsibility ratings.
Fig. 5. The eﬀect of luck and valence on ratings of essence-disclosure and responsibility (Study 4). Note: diﬀerent participants rated the essence-disclosure and
responsibility items. Dashed vertical-lines within boxes display 95% CIs around the means.
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this paper’s ﬁnal study explores how partisans explain the political
behavior of rivals as compared to fellow partisans.
5. Study 5: Partisan attribution
In discussing his conversion to Islam, Kareem Abdul-Jabbar com-
mented that for people born into their religion, “it is mostly a matter of
legacy and convenience.” For converts, however, “it is a matter of ﬁerce
conviction and deﬁance … because we need a powerful reason to
abandon the traditions of our families.” This is understandable since
religious disagreements within pious families are often costly (Boyatzis,
Dollahite, & Marks, 2006); a fact which helps to explain why they are
relatively rare (Kelley & Graaf, 1997). Because partisan conﬂict within
families is also costly and rare, parallel considerations apply to political
identities (Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Jennings, Stoker, & Bowers,
2009; Kohn, Slomczynski, & Schoenbach, 1986). For example, we learn
much more about a Liberal agent’s values if we learn she was raised by
Conservatives rather than by fellow Liberals.
The signiﬁcant diagnostic value of a family-dissonant political
identity suggests that people should prefer to explain such identities in
agent-focused terms. However, against a backdrop of intense aﬀective
polarization (Cliﬀord, 2017; Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015; Iyengar,
Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), the mismatch hy-
pothesis predicts that moral attitudes will play an important role in
modelling how people explain the actions of allies and rivals. For ex-
ample, agent-focused attributions should seem less appropriate when
explaining why someone defected for the rival party, despite the high
diagnostic value of that action.
Researchers studying the moral-psychological bases of political
ideology have reliably found that Conservatives tend to value in-
group loyalty and respect for authority more than Liberals (e.g.,
Feldman, 2003; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 2012; Gunther & Kuan,
2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Kohn, 1989; Schwartz, 2006;
Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). This suggests that Con-
servative participants may perceive a more serious moral violation
when an agent is disloyal to his family. If so, the degree to which this
highly diagnostic action is attributed to the agent himself may ad-
ditionally depend on participants’ own political identities. Study 5
therefore aimed to explore three questions: How do partisans’ moral
attitudes inﬂuence the explanations they provide for out-group po-
litical identities, and how strong is this eﬀect relative to the eﬀect of
a highly diagnostic action such as converting to a family-dissonant
ideology? Are Conservatives more reluctant than Liberals to accept
agent-focused explanations for family-dissonant identities? Are
these eﬀects mediated by the degree to which an agent’s political
identity appears to express her true self?
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
Participants were 670 North Americans ranging in age from 18 to
74 years (M=37; 59% female).
5.1.2. Procedure
The experiment employed a 2 (family ideology: liberal vs. con-
servative) × 2 (agent ideology) between-subjects design. Participants
were asked to either imagine an agent who grew up in a conservative
family or to imagine one who grew up in a liberal family. The agent was
also described as either liberal or conservative, generating four ex-
perimental conditions.
In the agent-family consonant conditions, when agent and family
shared a common political identity, participants read:
Imagine a person, Sam, who grew up in a politically conservative
[politically liberal] family. Like his parents, Sam often voted for
Conservative [Liberal] candidates.
In the agent-family dissonant conditions, when agent and family were
ideologically opposed, participants read:
Imagine a person, Sam, who grew up in a politically conservative
[politically liberal] family. However, unlike his parents, Sam often
voted for Liberal [Conservative] candidates.
In all conditions, participants rated the reverse-coded statement
“Voting liberal [conservative] did not reﬂect Sam’s true self—the
person he truly is deep down” on a scale ranging from 1 (‘Strongly
disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly agree’).
Because explanations typically seem more or less appropriate for
diﬀerent explananda, participants rated diﬀerent attributions in the
family-dissonant and family-consonant conditions. In the family-con-
sonant conditions, participants rated a paradigm situation-focused at-
tribution: “Sam voted conservative [liberal] because that’s how he was
raised.” In the family-dissonant conditions, participants rated a para-
digm agent-focused explanation: “Sam voted conservative [liberal]
because of his most cherished values.” The essence-disclosure and at-
tribution items were counterbalanced and followed by an attention
check.
On the next page (where the vignette was hidden), participants
reported the ideologies of the agent and his family. Participants iden-
tiﬁed as Liberal, Conservative, or ‘other’. Selecting ‘other’ prompted
participants to enter their identiﬁcation in their own words. Finally,
participants provided basic demographic information.
5.2. Results
Five hundred and eighty participants passed the attention checks;
295 identiﬁed as Liberal and 193 as Conservative. Because our primary
interest is in partisans, ‘others’ were not included here.1 Participants
who failed to correctly identify the political identity of the agent or his
family were excluded.
5.2.1. Essence-disclosure
Dummy variables for agent, family, and participant identities were
coded ‘1’ for Conservative and ‘0’ for Liberal. A dummy variable,
Consonance, was coded ‘1’ iﬀ the agent and family supported the same
ideology. To explore the eﬀects of consonance and perceived valence
side by side, essence-disclosure ratings were regressed against partici-
pant identity, agent identity, and agent-family consonance in a fully
crossed model. The resulting model (Table 8) was signiﬁcant,
R2= .085, MSE=2.2, F(7,479)= 6.3, p < .001. As expected, relative
to when the agent conformed with his parents’ favored ideology, his
political identity was seen as more essence-disclosing when he defected
to a family-dissonant ideology (0.64 points). Critically, however,
sharing an ideology with the participant also had a large, positive eﬀect
(0.92 points), indicating that perceived valence inﬂuenced essence-
disclosure ratings across conditions.
An unexpected main eﬀect of participant identity emerged such that
Conservatives gave slightly lower essence-disclosure ratings.
5.2.2. Attribution
Moderation analysis was used to explore the participant-agent in-
teraction. Participant identity was set as the focal predictor with agent
identity and agent-family consonance as moderators. The resulting
model was signiﬁcant, R2= .10, MSE=1.9, F(7,479)= 7.4, p < .001.
As Table 9a shows, sharing the agent’s ideology led participants to
emphasize the relevance of his values in the dissonant cases (+1.3
points) and to downplay the relevance of his upbringing in the con-
sonant cases (−1.2 points) (Fig. 6). Table 9b describes in more detail
how participants’ ratings were conditioned by agent and family
1When data from Independents was analyzed separately, no signiﬁcant ef-
fects emerged on either measure.
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identity. When the agent defected to Liberalism, Conservative partici-
pants were highly reluctant to attribute his political identity to his
values (−1.2 points). However, when the agent defected to Con-
servatism, both Liberal and Conservative participants rated his values
as equally important to explaining his politics (0.021 points). Partici-
pants’ responses were more evenly biased when the agent conformed
with his family’s favored ideology. Relative to Liberals, Conservatives
emphasized the agent’s upbringing when explaining Liberal con-
formism (0.54 points) and downplayed the agent’s upbringing when
explaining Conservative conformism (−0.65 points).
5.3. Conditional process analysis
The analyses above suggest that participant identity may moderate
the eﬀect of agent-family consonance by moderating the degree to
which the agent’s political identity appears to express his true self
(Fig. 7). Conditional process analysis (Hayes, 2013) was used to explore
this hypothesis. Participant identity was set as the focal predictor, with
agent identity and agent-family consonance as moderators and essence-
disclosure ratings as mediator.
The analysis indicated that the conditional eﬀect of agent-family
consonance was mediated by essence-disclosure ratings, B = 0.12, SE
= .11, 95% CI (bootstrapped): [−.051, .43]. In a subsequent ex-
ploratory analysis, the size of this eﬀect more than doubled when
outliers were excluded, B = 0.31, SE = .15, 95% CI (bootstrapped):
[.085, .69]. (Tukey’s convention of ± 1.5 × IQR classiﬁed 13 data
points as outliers.) When the analysis focused on agent-family dissonant
cases, the diﬀerence between the conditional indirect eﬀects was large,
indicating that the eﬀect of valence on how participants explained a
family-dissonant identity was substantially mediated by the degree to
which the agent’s identity appeared to reﬂect his true self, B= 0.64, SE
= .21, 95% CI (bootstrapped): [.30, 1.1].
5.4. Discussion
This study found that partisans’ explanatory preferences do not
consistently reﬂect the insight that a family-dissonant identity provides
more information about a person’s values than the ‘legacy and con-
venience’ of a family-consonant identity. Rather, our explanatory pre-
ferences reﬂect the diagnostic value of defection only when we evaluate
agents who defect to our own political ideology. If an agent instead
defects from our ideology, the eﬀect of his deﬁance is totally swamped
by the eﬀect of our disapprobation. In practice, this means that we end
up seeing his values as not more relevant to explaining his defection,
but less so. Indeed, our reactions are so biased that when an in-group
member abandons our ideology, his values appear even less relevant to
explaining his action than legacy and convenience appear to explaining
out-group political conformity.
While Conservatives were particularly inclined to discount the im-
portance of an agent’s values when he rejected his parents’ ideology,
Liberals were reluctant to acknowledge the explanatory relevance of a
Liberal agent’s upbringing to his family-consonant identity. If political
partisans represent both in-group and out-group members as essentially
virtuous, we may be able to understand these diﬀerences as a reﬂection
of the diﬀerent values that Liberals and Conservatives tend to hold (e.g.,
Feldman, 2003; Graham et al., 2012; Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Haidt &
Graham, 2007; Kohn, 1989; Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2010).
From the perspective of predominantly Conservative values, a family-
dissonant Liberal identity is doubly bad: ﬁrst, because it is Liberal, and
second, because the agent deﬁed authority and was disrespectful to his
parents. But from the perspective of Liberal values, a family-dissonant
Liberal identity is doubly good: ﬁrst, because it is Liberal, and second,
because the agent deﬁed authority and was disrespectful to his parents.
Hence, conditional on the mismatch hypothesis, values strongly asso-
ciated with partisan identities appear to be consistent with the pattern
of attributions that we see in the data.
These results suggest one way that belief in the virtuous true self
may contribute to aﬀective polarization. The more convinced we are of
the virtuousness of an out-group member’s true self, the more diﬃcult it
will be to recognize that her values are at work when she makes choices
that are, from our perspective, morally wrong. Because we doubt that
she is moved to action by her values, it may seem she is acting ‘in bad
faith’ when she is really pursuing her deepest commitments. Indeed,
belief in the good true self may help us to represent our rivals’ projects
as wrong not only from our own perspective, but also from theirs. If the
way our minds represent agents biases us towards explaining moral
dissent in non-agential terms, then perhaps this may lead coercion to
seem easier to justify than it should. (This paper concludes with a brief
discussion of other reasons to regret the virtuous true self bias.)
6. General discussion
Collectively, the studies presented here point to a large and robust
eﬀect of our moral attitudes and true-self beliefs on how we explain
valenced behavior. This eﬀect appears to arise from a general tendency
to represent agents as possessing true selves that are, to a surprising
degree, aligned with our own values (Newman et al., 2013;
Strohminger et al., 2017). Because of this bias, actions of which we
approve tend to seem more expressive of our own and others’ true
selves, and this causes us to prefer more agent-focused attributions.
6.1. Responsibility
6.1.1. Luck
Philosophers have long noticed that reﬂecting on the role that luck
plays in human life tends to diminish our sense that we are morally
responsible agents (e.g., Levy, 2011; Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981). For
example, but for the terrible misfortune of being born in Germany after
the First World War, a boy who would in fact go on to become a German
Table 8
Linear model predicting essence-disclosure ratings from participant ideology,
agent ideology, and agent-family consonance (Study 5). Note: Reference cate-
gories are Liberal and dissonant.
Table 9
(a) Eﬀect of participant-agent interaction on ratings of each attribution (Study
5). Note: the attribution rated was agent-focused (values) in the agent-family
consonant cases and situation-focused (upbringing) in the agent-family dis-
sonant cases.
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soldier might instead have gone on to lead a morally innocuous life
(perhaps in Australia). Reﬂecting on this fact and its terrifying dual
might shake our sense that soldiers of the past were fully responsible.
Theorists have been tempted to explain the apparent blame-miti-
gating power of luck by positing ‘control principles’ which hold that
agents are only considered responsible to the degree that their actions
seem to be under their control (e.g., Nagel, 1979). Applied to the
vignettes explored above, these principles suggest that we blame the
adopted Northern-born agent less because we recognize that his actions
are, to some signiﬁcant degree, caused by the extreme misfortune of his
being adopted by plantation-owning Southerners—something that was
never under his control. However, the present results suggest that this
plausible-sounding analysis is in fact incorrect. It predicts that learning
about the parallel role that luck played in the Southern-born agent’s
coming to help people will reduce our sense that he is praiseworthy for
his virtuous deeds, but this prediction was not supported by the data.
Theorists have often attempted to analyze the concept of luck in
‘modal’ terms—i.e., in terms of how events and actions causally covary
within contextually speciﬁed sets of initial conditions, frequently
modeled as possible worlds (e.g., Coﬀman, 2007; Levy, 2011; Pritchard,
2006). These analyses are all based on the intuitive idea that an event
or action is lucky to the degree that it could easily have failed to occur.
For example, on these views, winning the New Jersey State Lottery
counts as enormously lucky because of how easily the winner could
have ended up like any of an enormous number of losers, even holding
ﬁxed all (or most) of the conditions that in fact led to a windfall. In
popular philosophical terminology: an event is inﬂuenced by luck to the
degree that it does not occur in suﬃciently many nearby possible
worlds in which the relevant initial conditions obtain. Theorists dis-
agree about how to elaborate this intuition into a satisfactory account of
moral luck. However, reminiscent of classical accounts of the person/
situation distinction, many philosophers have attempted to understand
luck primarily in terms of the nature of the causal relations that con-
dition outcomes on contingent features of the environment. The present
studies indicate that ordinary people rely on a fundamentally diﬀerent
concept of luck, at least when they attempt to understand and explain
morally valenced actions. According to this folk concept, the moral
valences of an agent’s true self and action are relevant to whether she
was the beneﬁciary (or victim) of luck.
6.1.2. Determinism
Reﬂecting on the (putatively) deterministic nature of our universe
aﬀects people’s responsibility judgments quite diﬀerently depending on
whether the target action is represented as virtuous or immoral (Nelkin,
2011; Pizarro et al., 2003; Wolf, 1980). In particular, determinism
appears to undermine blame far more readily than praise. (In this
context, ‘determinism’ is the claim that the laws of nature and the state
of the universe in the distant past jointly entail a unique future.)
Some theorists hypothesize that this determinism-valence asym-
metry arises because people tacitly shift between two distinct concep-
tions of responsibility (e.g., Watson, 1996). On this view, when we
judge that a determined agent is responsible for her virtuous deeds, we
make a judgment about responsibility in the sense of ‘attributabil-
ity’—i.e., that the action is essence-disclosing. However, when we judge
that an agent is less blameworthy because we believe her immoral
deeds to be causally determined, we make a judgment about respon-
sibility in the sense of ‘accountability’—i.e., that the agent is less de-
serving of contempt or punishment on account of her action. This ex-
planation is designed to preserve the idea that from within each
perspective there is no determinism-valence asymmetry: causally de-
termined agents can be responsible in the sense of attributability for both
virtuous and immoral deeds; but in the sense of accountability they can
be responsible for neither. The ﬁndings reported here tell against this
ambiguity-based explanation of the asymmetry. People’s judgments
Fig. 6. Ratings of two attributions: the agent supported a family-consonant candidate “because that’s how he was raised” (left), and the agent supported a family-
dissonant candidate “because of his most cherished values” (right).
Fig. 7. Conceptual diagram for mediated conditional moderation analysis
(Study 5). Lines represent causal pathways and line-arrow intersections re-
present moderation of one eﬀect by another. Dashed lines show the indirect
conditional eﬀect of perceived valence on attribution.
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about accountability–“How negatively or positively does [the agent]
deserve to be treated?”—display the same asymmetry as their judg-
ments about essence-disclosure (Fig. 5). As noted above, this is pow-
erful evidence against ambiguity-based explanations, as diﬀerent par-
ticipants responded to the two outcome measures.
Another common explanation for the determinism asymmetry be-
gins with the idea that responsible agents must possess the ability to ‘do
the right thing for the right reasons’ (e.g., Nelkin, 2005; Wolf, 1980).
On this account, when we assess whether an agent is responsible for
ϕ-ing, we ﬁrst assess whether there was most reason for the agent to ϕ.
If we judge that there was not, we will only hold the agent responsible
to the degree that we believe he could have done other than ϕ. (Since we
do not have most reason to perform immoral deeds, if the agent was
able at the time of action to do the morally right thing, then he must
have been able to do something other than ϕ.) On the other hand, if we
believe that the agent was ϕ-ing for the very reason in virtue of which it
is right to ϕ, then we will not be interested in whether he could instead
have done some other, immoral deed. After all, a cool-headed mother
who can restrain herself while her children are helplessly trapped in a
house ﬁre does not seem, intuitively, more praiseworthy than one
whose love renders her unable to resist a perilous rescue attempt—even
if the cool-headed mother eﬀortlessly wills herself to behave like the
loving mother (Wolf, 1980).
Recent experimental research may appear to support this explana-
tion of the determinism-valence asymmetry (e.g., Pizarro et al., 2003).
However, because the asymmetry also appears to arise when we con-
sider cases, like those in Study 4, where blameworthy agents are
(presumably) able to do otherwise, the present studies suggest that this
explanation is incorrect (also see Newman et al., 2014). Remarkably,
the same asymmetry seen in our judgments about causally determined
agents appears to arise even when there is no suggestion that the agents
were overcome by irresistible emotions, that they are the denizens of
deterministic universes, or that they lacked the ability to do the right
thing for the right reasons. Hence, it seems implausible that the
asymmetry arises because the folk theory of responsibility only requires
that agents can do otherwise when they behave immorally.
By contrast, the determinism asymmetry makes sense if our ex-
planatory preferences behave as the mismatch hypothesis describes.
For, when we perceive a mismatch in the moral valences of the action
and the agent’s true self, we will tend to represent the action as con-
cealing the true self, if there are suitable situation-focused explanations
available. The mismatch hypothesis therefore suggests that the role of
causal determinism is to make available a powerful, situation-focused
explanation for any action at all—the laws of nature and the state of the
universe in the distant past made me do it. If true, this helps to explain why
we sometimes judge that an agent who behaves badly by ϕ-ing in a
deterministic universe is less blameworthy than an otherwise-similar
agent who ϕs in an indeterministic universe (Feltz & Millan, 2015;
Nichols & Knobe, 2007; but cf., Murray & Nahmias, 2014).
6.2. The ego-syntonic/ego-dystonic distinction
In their important commentary on the actor-observer literature,
Sabini et al. (2001) argued that the intuitive person/situation distinc-
tion is between ego-syntonic and ego-dystonic actions, i.e., between ac-
tions agents endorse reﬂectively and those they do not. The classic
example is an ‘unwilling addict’ who may desire a substance while also
hoping that this desire fails to lead her to use the substance (Frankfurt,
1971). Her occurrent desires seem not to reﬂect what she would want
were she cool, calm, and collected. To the degree that this is so, her
drug use is ego-dystonic. This understanding of the distinction parallels
popular compatibilist theorizing and generates many of the same ver-
dicts as the mismatch hypothesis. However, the ego-syntonic/ego-dys-
tonic dichotomy cannot capture the full range of intuitions revealed by
the present studies. For example, while most people in Studies 1–2
agreed that the agent’s sexual attraction to men was not something he
endorsed reﬂectively (i.e., that it was ego-dystonic), people with dif-
ferent attitudes towards homosexuality diﬀered greatly in how they
explained the agent’s homosexual behavior. If we analyze the distinc-
tion in terms of the dichotomy between ego-syntonic and ego-dystonic
actions, this variance must remain unexplained.
Sabini et al.’s insight is to understand situation-focused explanations
in terms of causes that are “external not to the person, but to the per-
son’s self.” However, to capture intuitions about cases like the ones
studied here, the self must be understood as the true self, and the
concept of the true self is not exhausted by what a person reﬂectively
aﬃrms—or indeed, by any other naturalistic, non-evaluative feature of
his psychology. Rather, when explaining morally valenced actions, we
will discount an agent’s own aﬃrmations when we disapprove of his
reﬂectively endorsed attitudes. For example, although Mark’s erotic
feelings appear to be ego-dystonic (unlike his religiously motivated
beliefs),2 this fact does not prevent people with positive moral attitudes
towards homosexuality from seeing his same-sex encounters as essence-
disclosing. The folk concept of the true self allows that we can be
mistaken in what we reﬂectively endorse: our true selves are something
we must discover (Bench, Schlegel, Davis, & Vess, 2015). Thus, ana-
lyzing the person/situation distinction in terms of reﬂective endorse-
ment appears to treat as constitutive what is really heuristic.
6.3. Strategic beneﬁts of belief in the virtuous true self
Why do our minds represent agents as divided into true and su-
perﬁcial selves, and why do we tend to assume the true self is aligned
with our own values, even when the agent belongs to a stigmatized out-
group? One approach to these questions (e.g., De Freitas et al., 2017;
Newman et al., 2014; Strohminger & Nichols, 2014) begins with the
idea that the true-self concept reﬂects a more general tendency of
human minds to represent the surface features of animals (among other
categories) as caused by hidden, underlying essences (Gelman, 2003).
This hypothesis—psychological essentialism—is plausibly relevant to
explaining why people represent the self as divided, but it seems less
satisfying as an explanation for why members of stigmatized groups are
represented as ‘deep down’ normatively aligned with the self. However,
this surprising ﬁnding has emerged with participants from both in-
dependent and interdependent cultures (De Freitas et al., 2018, and
Study 2 of the present work), suggesting that belief in the virtuous true
self may be a species-typical feature of human psychology. Thus, it is
worth considering (however speculatively) whether it may have helped
to solve diﬃcult sociobiological problems that our evolutionary an-
cestors would have faced repeatedly (Williams, 2008).
Consider someone who believes that gay sex is a grotesque moral
wrong, for example, a high-prejudice participant from Study 1. This
participant will surely have a powerful moral reaction to gay sex, yet
this need not color her representation of the agent’s true self (cf., De
Freitas & Cikara, 2018). Indeed, even when participants were told that
the agent regularly experiences erotic attraction to a variety of other men
(in Study 2), the most highly prejudiced participants continued to ex-
plain the agent’s same-sex encounter in non-agential terms (a bad up-
bringing, traumatic sexual experiences, stress-induced weakness, and so
on). This illustrates one of the strange consequences of representing the
self as divided: at least according to folk psychology, it seems you don’t
have to be good to be good deep down.
Belief in the virtuous true self may therefore have been adaptive
because it allowed people’s responses to norm violators to come apart
from their responses to norm violations. This might have been useful for
many reasons. To appreciate one possible strategic beneﬁt, consider A
2 Indeed, prior to 1987, Mark might have received treatment (probably,
aversion therapy) for ‘ego-dystonic homosexuality’—a diagnosis that had re-
placed ‘sexual orientation disturbance’ in the American Psychiatric
Association’s diagnostic manual, DSM-III.
S. Cullen Cognition 180 (2018) 165–181
177
and B, two members of a tight-knit, traditionally structured tribe.
Because they live cooperatively in the same village, if A believes B
shares his values and interests, and B believes the same of A, they will
both be substantially correct—a fact which may lead to signiﬁcant ﬁt-
ness beneﬁts for each (Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2000; Johnson & Earle,
2000). Now consider two members of two distinct tribes. They do not
cooperate in a more than incidental way, and even this is limited to a
small region where their respective territories overlap. Consequently,
their values and interests are often in conﬂict (Diamond, 2013). The
eﬀect of the virtuous true self bias on these two agents will be to make
each insensitive to the interests of the other, reducing the risk that ei-
ther will incur harms or sacriﬁce beneﬁts for someone in whom he has
no ﬁtness stake.
Shameless nepotism may seem to provide a more elegant solution.
Why not make the moral value of an action depend, in part, on the
identity of the actor? Perhaps humans use both strategies to focus their
moral concern on members of their own ethnic, racial or language
groups (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006). However, indis-
criminately representing agents as, deep down, normatively aligned
with the self may have better reconciled two opposing demands biology
places on moral norms (McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). First,
moral norms need to win the alliance of most members of a cooperating
group, else morality will not serve one of its primary functions—ef-
fectively coordinating the group’s behavior (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009).
Thus, eﬀective moral norms must have at least the pretense of im-
partiality. This pressure helps to explain why the moral value of an
action is often taken to depend on features of the action, rather than the
identity of the actor. However, moral agents must also be somewhat
parochial, lest morality lead them to emit beneﬁts or absorb costs for
people unlikely to return the favor. Belief in the virtuous true self might
have been adaptive because it helped our ancestors to reconcile these
seemingly inconsistent demands. More generally, defaulting to the be-
lief that others are normatively aligned with the self may have helped to
mitigate some of the biological costs induced by our sensitivity to moral
norms. For example, belief in the virtuous true self may have helped
vengeful agents to mend beneﬁcial relationships after retaliating
against severe norm violators (McCullough et al., 2013).
Speculations like these are famously diﬃcult to test, yet they sug-
gest clearly enough that there may have been surprising beneﬁts to
indiscriminately representing other agents as normatively aligned with
the self. Thus, psychological essentialism may explain why people de-
velop the true-self concept, while strategic sociobiological beneﬁts may
explain why the true self tends to be represented as virtuous.
6.4. Why it may be better not to believe people are virtuous
The preceding discussion and this paper’s ﬁrst two studies may also
illuminate how representing the true self as virtuous can lead to painful
inner conﬂicts and may slow the rate at which social norms change. As
recently as the 1960s, law and social pressure led many gay men to
undergo ‘reparative’ medical treatments—commonly, electric shock-
based aversion therapy (Haldeman, 1991). Meanwhile, childhood
abuse, parental neglect, mental illness, and demonic possession of the
sort described by the Bible were all alleged to explain homosexuality.
The mismatch hypothesis suggests that this association may be ex-
plained, in part, by cognitive processes that preexist political ideology.
It may also help to explain why, even today, the belief that sexual or-
ientation is innate predicts support for gay rights (Jayaratne et al.,
2006; Wood & Bartkowski, 2004). When people are asked a technical
question, such as whether a human trait is innate, they will often re-
spond by consulting their intuitions about a seemingly related question
(Cullen, 2010), such as whether that trait expresses the agent’s true self.
This suggests that belief in the virtuous true self may incline people to
reject genetic attributions for negative traits.
In the United States, attitudes towards homosexuality began to
improve markedly in the 1970s, a period during which genetic
explanations of homosexuality became more widely accepted (Hicks &
Lee, 2006; Sherkat, Powell-Williams, Maddox, & De Vries, 2011). Per-
haps people came to represent sexual orientation as ‘innate’ and this
facilitated a broad change in their attitudes towards homosexuality
(Sheldon, Pfeﬀer, Jayaratne, Feldbaum, & Petty, 2007; Wood &
Bartkowski, 2004;); however, the mismatch hypothesis suggests that
the causation may have traveled in the reverse direction. For example,
cohort eﬀects may have improved attitudes towards homosexuality
(Andersen & Fetner, 2008; Treas, 2002) and this may have caused
same-sex attraction to appear more essence-disclosing (‘innate’). Thus,
a tendency to represent the true self as virtuous may also help to explain
the continued attraction of psychotherapies aimed at ‘reorienting’ non-
heterosexuals (Dean Byrd, Nicolosi, & Potts, 2008; Haldeman, 2002).
The diversity of human values ensures that people who live in large,
high-density societies will regularly interact with non-normative agents
(Esmer & Pettersson, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Norris & Inglehart,
2011). Because we represent the true self as virtuous, we tend to view
such agents as, in some deeper sense, normatively aligned with our-
selves. But there is little reason to believe that this involves representing
them as ethically competent or ourselves as having corresponding pro
tanto reasons to respect their stated preferences. To the contrary,
commitment to the hidden virtuousness of non-normative agents seems
to involve representing these agents as the unwitting victims of external
forces that mask their underlying ethical capacities.
7. Conclusion
A long tradition in psychology holds that our explanatory pre-
ferences are primarily driven by causal-statistical (‘covariation’) in-
formation (e.g., Kelley, 1967, 1973, 1987). In the present studies,
however, the explanatory preferences of both North American and In-
dian participants were surprisingly unrelated to such information. By
contrast, the mismatch hypothesis robustly predicted explanatory pre-
ferences across actions as varied as having consensual gay sex, aborting
a pregnancy, converting to Islam, owning slaves in the antebellum
South, and identifying as Conservative or Liberal today. Thus, the re-
sults reported here are plausibly general and should emerge whenever
people explain valenced actions.
Theorists of responsibility often appear to assume that intuitive
judgments about essence-disclosure primarily reﬂect facts about how
actions are related to agents’mental states (e.g., Frankfurt, 1969; Smith,
2005; Sripada, 2016; Watson, 1996). However, the studies reported
here support a strikingly diﬀerent account of the processes underlying
these intuitions. Researchers pursuing true self theories of responsibility
should address the extent to which such processes provide appropriate
inputs to normative theorizing.
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Appendix A. Vignettes
A.1. Study 1
Mark was raised in a large family. They went to church [temple]
every week and were dedicated to charity. For most of Mark’s child-
hood the family was very happy. But his parents began to ﬁght, and
eventually they divorced. Mark’s family members grew uninterested in
religion. This especially hurt him, since he had always felt a deep
spiritual calling.
Soon after the divorce, Mark’s mother found a new husband and
started a new family. Mark’s mother began to ignore him, and when
Mark turned 16, his mother thought he should leave home. Out of
home, Mark started hanging out with a new group of kids, some of
whom were in same-sex relationships.
Mark believed that homosexuality is morally wrong, and he en-
couraged his new friends to resist their attractions to people of the same
sex. However, Mark also realized that he himself was attracted to other
men. He openly acknowledged this to his friends and discussed it as part
of his own personal struggle. Mark believed that resisting his attraction
to other men was his duty to God, and he vowed to live a morally
decent life by remaining celibate.
However, Mark sometimes failed to live up to his values. For ex-
ample, one day, after a bad ﬁght with his father, Mark went to see his
friend Bill. They talked for hours over a bottle of wine. That night, Mark
hit on Bill and they ended up having sex.
A.2. Study 2
A.2.1. Baseline
As in Study 1.
A.2.2. Situation
As in Study 1, with the following appended:
Most people do not ﬁnd Bill attractive, and in the past Mark himself
has rarely felt sexually attracted to Bill. In fact, Mark has rarely
experienced attraction to men other than Bill.
A.2.3. Person
As in Study 1, with the following appended:
Most people do not ﬁnd Bill attractive, but in the past Mark has
often felt sexually attracted to Bill. In fact, Mark has often experi-
enced attraction to men other than Bill, too.
A.2.4. Substitutions for Indian participants
‘Mark’→ ‘Aarav’.
‘Bill’→ ‘Arjun’.
‘duty to God’→ ‘duty’
A.3. Study 3a
Kate is a senior at college. Just like many of her friends, after gra-
duation Kate plans to spend a year working for a charity organization
before pursuing her dream of going to medical school.
Kate has recently discovered that she is pregnant. And what’s
worse, her boyfriend broke up with her just a week earlier. When she
tells her parents, their reaction is clear: although they will support
her no matter what she decides, they both think that she should
abort the pregnancy. Kate’s friends also agree that she should get an
abortion.
Kate’s local health clinic oﬀers the procedure. After thinking it over,
Kate decides to have an abortion.
A.4. Study 3b
Jane was raised in a large family. They went to church every week
and were dedicated to charity. For most of Jane’s childhood the family
was very happy. But her parents began to ﬁght, and eventually they got
divorced. Jane’s family members became uninterested in religion. This
especially hurt her, since she had always felt a deep spiritual calling.
Soon, Jane’s mother found a new husband and started a new family.
Her mother began to ignore Jane, and when Jane turned 16, her mother
thought Jane should leave home. Out of home, Jane needed money. She
was good looking, so she started working as a model. But Jane’s mod-
eling agent pressured her to lose weight, which disgusted her and she
soon quit modeling.
Jane started hanging out with a new group of kids, some of whom
were Muslim. Jane was intrigued by their religion and decided to learn
more about Islam. She discovered that many of these kids were also
involved in charity through their mosque. She valued what she saw as
their moral uprightness. And she perceived a kind of moral clarity in
Islamic texts which she found reassuring. She came to believe that Islam
is the one true path to God.
Eventually, Jane decided that she would convert to Islam.
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